Ups
and Downs of Audit Fees Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
A Closer Look at the
Effects of Compliance
By
Jack T. Ciesielski and Thomas R. Weirich
OCTOBER 2006 - Media
coverage and discussions of the costs of compliance with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the cost of audits in general
are inescapable—to the point that many believe that
SOX needs to be repealed or the economy will be doomed. Because
a company’s income statement has no line item that highlights
this compliance expense, the investing public is left with
unproven allegations that the law’s costs exceed its
benefits. One significant compliance cost is audit fees, which
have been demonized in the press. This article examines these
compliance costs and their changing nature for the Standard
& Poor’s (S&P) 500, which reveals that auditing
firms do not necessarily benefit to the extent one might think.
First
Impressions
The
auditing profession has received much criticism for the
increase in audit fees since the demise of Arthur Andersen,
and the costs associated with the much-reviled section 404
of SOX have only made the criticism sharper. Hard facts
pertaining to this criticism include the following:
-
Between 2001 and 2004, total audit and audit-related fees
increased 103% for 496 of the S&P 500 companies. The
fees increased 41% in 2004 alone. (Throughout this article,
only 496 of the S&P 500 companies’ audit fees
were examined. Four entities—Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, Interpublic, and News Corporation—were excluded
due to a lack of available 2004 information.)
-
Fees for tax services that auditors provided to their
clients increased 28% over the same timeframe; however,
total tax-related fees have decreased each year since
2002. All other fees, which formerly included fees for
financial reporting systems and design engagements (now
prohibited), dropped from about $2.3 billion in 2001 to
about $100 million in 2004. Audit fee increases made up
the difference.
-
Smaller companies in the S&P 500 had the bigger percentage
change in audit fees.
n Audit fees as a percent of revenues have increased,
but not to a great degree. For the 50 companies demonstrating
the biggest effect, the median increase in the ratio was
only 17% between 2001 and 2004.
-
Expressed as an after-tax per-share amount, audit fees
were $0.03 or less per share for 93% of the firms in the
S&P 500.
n The average 2004 audit fee for S&P 500 companies
has more than doubled since 2001. Over the same timeframe,
audit fees have increased to 82% of auditors’ total
fees (41% in 2001). Clearly, auditing firms are doing
more auditing work than before.
Exhibit
1 further supports the statement that audit fees have
increased, at least with regard to the S&P 500: Combined
2004 audit fees and audit-related fees increased 41% over
2003 fees, the first year that large companies had to comply
with SOX section 404. (Smaller companies, with market capitalization
of less than $75 million, have until their first fiscal
year ending after July 15, 2008, to issue their first section
404 reports.) Section 404 requires companies to have an
adequate system of internal controls, and independent auditors
must attest that the control system is functioning adequately.
This is one reason for the increase in audit fees. Another
reason is that auditors, in the post-Enron world, are spending
more time and effort actually auditing their clients, rather
than using the audit as a door-opener to sell other services.
Cynical observers might argue that auditing firms are acting
out of self-preservation, but investors should welcome the
increased scrutiny of financial statements. Anything that
puts the auditor into a more inquisitive, independent mode
will increase investor confidence in the capital markets.
The
long-term data also support the “more audit”
supposition presented in Exhibit 1 when comparing 2004 data
to 2001. In 2004, audit fees and audit-related fees constituted
a significantly larger portion of audit firm income than
in 2001.
A
Second Look
Although
the increase in audit fees was stunning in 2004, and significant
in each year since 2001, a comparison of current total audit
fees to 2001—when Enron rocked the world—shows
a 103% increase. Perhaps there really is a difference in
the quality of the audits done before and after the major
frauds of the recent past. Admittedly, however, the comparison
is not completely fair.
Exhibit
2 shows the fee classification criteria as they currently
exist. The first batch of fee disclosures took place in
proxies issued in fiscal years after February 2001; it was
the first time since 1981 that such information was reported.
Initially, there were only three classifications of fees:
“audit fees,” “financial information systems
design and implementation fees,” and “all other
fees.” The categories were revamped in 2002, effective
for 2003 financials. The financial information systems design
and implementation fees category was eliminated, and two
new categories were added: “tax services” and
“audit-related fees.” Two years’ worth
of comparable data also became the norm, instead of mere
single-year reporting.
In
further analysis, the numbers in Exhibit 1 are not directly
comparable from beginning to end. The 2001 figures are likely
understated, but to an unknown degree, because the “audit-related
fees” incurred in 2001 and 2002 may have been included
in the “all other” category. (Although some
companies may have included them in audit fees.) The 2004
and 2003 figures should be comparable.
The
fee increases that occurred in 2002 through 2004 stoked
the anti-SOX fires and led to the accusation of price gouging.
This was compounded by the simultaneous increase in tax
fees. Exhibit
3 shows that tax fees charged by auditors were up 28%
from 2001 to 2004. Note, however, that there was no required
tax services category for reporting fees in 2001. When the
2003 disclosures became available, they were presented on
a comparable basis to 2002, so the figures from 2002 through
2004 should be comparable, and they tell a different story
than the 2001-to-2004 comparison. Audit firm fees for tax
services have been dropping since 2002, when SOX’s
new restrictions on permitted tax services took hold.
In
reviewing Exhibit
4, “all other fees” (including fees for
financial systems design/implementation) over the past four
years have substantially disappeared. The 2001 figures may
be deceptive, however, because they may include tax service
fees as well as some audit-related costs. They definitely
contain financial systems design and implementation fees,
which were barred after 2001; they were nonexistent in the
2004 figures.
For
all the arguments about fee hikes, when the different services
are combined to calculate total fees paid to auditors, the
2004 total is approximately equal to 2001. Exhibit
5 shows that total fees paid to auditors increased by
about 1% from 2001 to 2004. The overall decrease in 2002
and 2003 fees was driven primarily by the discontinuance
of system design and implementation engagements and by diminished
offerings of other services.
Nearly
$5 billion of payments to auditors in 2004 are unlikely
to have the same earnings impact as in 2001, when $505.3
million was attributable to system design and implementation
services. Also probable is that those amounts were capitalized
with minimal effect on 2001 earnings. That 2001 category
may have contained significant fees for tax services, which
would have directly affected earnings. There is no way to
know for certain how much of the 2001 “all other”
category consisted of tax services.
A
Different View on Materiality
How
could anyone expect audit fees not to increase after auditors
had their revenue streams limited by the SEC after 2000,
or after the contemporaneous corporate increased audit risk?
Audit fees had to increase, to help minimize litigation
through sturdier audits or to pay for litigation expenses
when a sturdier audit wasn’t enough. How could anyone
expect audit fees to remain static after section 404 mandated
effective internal controls and auditor inspection of them?
Exhibit
6 shows the median change in audit fees for the years
2003 and 2004, arranged by market capitalization in deciles,
with the first decile being the largest companies in the
S&P 500 and the last decile containing the smallest.
In
the bottom four deciles, containing the companies with the
smallest capitalization, the median 2004 increase in audit
fees averaged slightly more than $1 million. Although the
year-to-year percentage change may be significant, the absolute
dollars are not exorbitant.
Exhibit
7 shows another method of analysis: a comparison of
total audit fees (audit fees plus audit-related fees) to
revenues for 2001 to 2004. The percentage of audit fees
to revenues also shows the effect of audit fees on operating
and pretax income margins. The Exhibit shows 50 companies
that experienced the largest percentage increase in total
audit fees between 2001 and 2004. Notice the companies marked
with an asterisk in the “2001–2004 Change”
column. These 17 companies are unique in that their revenues
were less in 2004 than in 2001. Even if their audit fees
had never increased, their percentage of audit fees to revenues
would still have increased. Looking at the effects of audit
fees for the 50 companies that experienced the largest increases
might lead one to mistakenly believe that the incremental
costs in audit fees are as bad as rumored. The median change
in audit fees to revenues for that group is an increase
of 17%. Scan the list carefully and notice some company
names that may have been “under-audited” in
2001, with restatement issues since then.
The
most-watched materiality threshold may be the effect that
audit fees had on earnings per share. For 93% of the S&P
500 companies in 2004, the cost amounted to $0.03 per share
or less. In 2001, 98% of the firms had a $0.03 (or less)
per-share effect. The EPS of 64% of the companies were unaffected
by audit fees in 2004, as compared to 86% in 2001.
Auditors
and Investors
Exhibit
8 is thought-provoking because it shows how important
auditing has become to audit firms during the last four
years.
With
many growth avenues closed to them by the SEC’s changes
in independence rules in 2001 (Rule No. 33-7919) and 2003
(Rule No. 33-8183; both available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm),
and the added responsibility of signing off on internal
control systems under SOX section 404, auditing again became
a major source of revenue for accounting firms. Eighty-two
percent of audit-firm billings are generated by auditing
engagements. Although the rules banned auditors from offering
certain incompatible services to their audit clients, firms
can still offer those services to nonaudit clients. With
fewer business opportunities at their existing audit clients,
auditors seem to be devoting more time to the audit, and
justifying their higher fees.
Ultimately,
the audit clients are a company’s shareholders. Yet
the sharpest criticism about unfair increases in audit fees
is usually not from shareholders, but from managements complaining
that audit fees and section 404 requirements are harming
shareholders with increased expense. But audit fees are
not nearly as bad as they have been portrayed once one actually
spends some time looking at the numbers and comparing them
to historical trends and relevant yardsticks.
Furthermore,
in December 2005 a study by CRA International (www.crai.com)
reported survey data indicating that second-year section
404 implementation costs were expected to decline an average
of 39% for smaller companies and 42% for larger companies.
In addition, the report indicated that audit fees related
to first-year section 404 implementation accounted for approximately
35% of total section 404 implementation costs for smaller
companies and 26% for larger companies.
What
the Evidence Shows
Stockholders
are the owners of corporations, and managers are their agents.
One way for shareholders to judge how effectively management
is managing the corporation is through the financial reporting
process. Yet, as seen in the early 2000s, management can
manipulate financial statements to suit their own purposes.
That is why the audit function is so critical. The auditor
is another agent for the shareholders, charged with ensuring
that management’s reporting to shareholders is done
fairly and is materially accurate. That is also why restrictions
on incompatible services make sense; there are fewer distractions
and conflicts of interest to affect the independence of
audit firms. The evidence shows that accounting firms are
being paid better for audit engagements than they used to
be, and this may be a sufficient incentive to keep them
focused on the task of auditing.
Jack
T. Ciesielski is president of R.G. Associates, Inc.,
Baltimore, Md.
Thomas R. Weirich, PhD, CPA, is a professor
of accounting at Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant,
Mich.
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