Factors
Affecting Juror Perceptions in Liability Cases
By
Duane Brandon, Jennifer Mueller, and Richard Tabor
MAY 2005
- A 2004 Wall Street Journal article pointed out
that the rising cost of arbitration proceedings has some disputants
considering whether they would be better off in the court
system. Furthermore, various surveys that compare verdicts
favoring plaintiffs and those favoring defendants suggest
that neither side in a dispute should assume that a jury automatically
favors one side over the other.
CPAs
involved in litigation face a number of practical questions
that must be answered correctly. Being informed will assist
CPA defendants, as well as provide an opportunity for meaningful
consultation with legal counsel during the litigation process.
CPAs
and Juror Perception
CPA-Client
Relationship. When a CPA becomes a defendant,
it is often because of a decision made while performing
work for a client. It is important to consider how jurors
will comprehend and interpret the relationship between the
CPA and the client. Jurors may assume that a CPA had motive
to act a certain way because of the client’s importance
relative to other clients. If the CPA was performing work
that required independence under the professional standards,
such as a financial statement audit or review, plaintiff’s
counsel will likely bring the relationship to light.
Research
shows that when a CPA earned significant revenue on the
engagement in question, jurors perceive that the CPA must
have been acting in her own best interest. (See D.M Brandon
and J.M. Mueller, “The Effect of Client Importance
on Juror Evaluations of Auditor Liability,” Behavioral
Research in Accounting forthcoming). That is, they
assume that the CPA had lost her objectivity and independence.
The jurors are then apt to find a CPA more liable and deserving
of punishment when receiving high fees.
Because
this issue is predominantly about fees being earned from
a client, it should be evaluated at several levels. Consider
the proportion of the fees allocated to an individual CPA,
to his local office, and to the firm itself. A jury may
respond negatively if a client represents a large portion
of an individual CPA’s work (or of the local office’s
work), even if the fees are relatively insignificant to
the firm as a whole.
Hindsight
bias. Hindsight is not always 20/20. A natural
human tendency called “hindsight bias” can alter
jurors’ perceptions of a past event because they know
the outcome. Without realizing it, they tend to assume that
the defendant would have known the future outcome at the
time the incident was occurring. This happens because jurors,
attempting to recreate the scenario, cannot separate information
that was known at the time of the incident from information
that could not have been known at the time of the incident.
Research in accounting-related litigation has specifically
shown this bias to occur with both jurors and judges [see
D.J. Lowe and P.M.J. Reckers, “The Effects of Hindsight
Bias on Juror Evaluations of Auditor Decisions,” Decision
Sciences, vol. 25(3), 1994, and J.C. Anderson et al.,
“The Mitigation of Hindsight Bias in Judges’
Evaluation of Auditor Decisions,” Auditing—A
Journal of Practice & Theory, vol. 16(2), 1997].
Researchers
have designed and tested techniques to mitigate this bias
in hopes of developing a way for CPAs and their counsel
to combat it. One method that has proved effective, for
jurors in particular, is for the jurors to consider alternative
outcomes. With this method, jurors are asked to consider
other, more positive, potential outcomes and how likely
those outcomes would have been, given only the facts known
at the time of the incident. The jurors can even be asked
to create their own ideas of other outcomes that would have
been reasonable to believe at the time of the incident.
In studies, jurors asked to do this have viewed the actions
of a CPA defendant much less negatively. The technique has
not been effective with judges. Appealing to judges to consider
alternative stakeholders, however, has been effective, and
this type of appeal might be an alternative technique for
jurors as well. This technique asks the judge or jury to
consider parties other than the plaintiff (e.g., management,
employees, customers) that might have been negatively affected
had the CPA defendant acted differently. The technique is
particularly useful when the defendant was responsible to
more than one party, because it helps the judge or juror
understand the thought process required of the CPA defendant
at that time.
“Deep
pockets.” Another significant issue
for CPAs is that their perceived wealth may negatively influence
how they will be treated by jurors. Large corporations,
professionals, and other wealthy targets of civil litigation
have historically claimed juror bias against them. Jurors
are often viewed as modern-day Robin Hoods, ready to enrich
undeserving plaintiffs in civil lawsuits at the expense
of wealthy defendants with “deep pockets.” This
fear leads some people to conclude that jurors may ignore
the strength of a defendant’s case, making settlement
the most viable alternative.
A recent
study investigated the assumed deep-pocket bias in an accounting-related
liability context [see D.J. Lowe, P.M.J. Reckers, and S.M.
Whitecotton, “The Effects of Decision-Aid Use and
Reliability on Jurors’ Evaluations of Auditor Liability,”
The Accounting Review, vol. 77(1), 2002]. The researchers
found that jurors were not more likely to find for the plaintiff
when a case was against a larger (and presumably wealthier)
accounting firm. The study did show, however, that jurors
tended to award larger damages against a presumed wealthier
defendant.
Juror
demographics. Attorneys and legal scholars
have long struggled with the issue of how juror demographics
and predispositions can affect trial outcomes. The relationship
between juror demographics (e.g., gender, age, socioeconomic
status) and how jurors decide civil disputes, appears to
be minor at best. One study found no relationship between
juror demographics and decisions in accountants’ liability
cases (D.J. Lowe and K. Pany, “Expectations of the
Audit Function,” The CPA Journal, August
1993). In the aforementioned study by Lowe, Reckers, and
Whitecotton, however, certain demographics affected some
juror decisions but not others. These conflicting studies
illustrate what legal scholars have historically experienced
in mock juror studies: Demographics are unreliable predictors
of juror decisions about civil liability.
On
the other hand, juror attitudes seem much more promising
in predicting how a juror may view a civil case. Research
consistently shows that preexisting attitudes tend to bias
the interpretation of evidence. This bias appears to be
so pervasive that jurors may even interpret evidence that
contradicts their presuppositions to support a preexisting
attitude. If attitudes can be ascertained, it is useful
to know that jurors in favor of tort reform are less likely
to find for the plaintiff and tend to award less in damages
(G. Moran, B.L. Cutler, and A. De Lisa, “Attitudes
Toward Tort Reform, Scientific Jury Selection, and Juror
Bias: Verdict Inclination in Criminal and Civil Trials,”
Law and Psychology Review, vol. 18, 1994). Similarly,
jurors that believe there is a “litigation crisis”
support smaller damage awards (E. Greene, J. Goodman, and
E.F. Loftus, “Jurors’ Attitudes About Civil
Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards,” American
University Law Review, vol. 40, 1991).
Empathy.
Long-standing legal lore posits that jurors often empathize
with the damaged party in a lawsuit. The recent financial-reporting
scandals may make this lore even stronger because of a general
disapproval of corporations and the accounting profession.
At the American Corporate Counsel Association, however,
research by Montgomery, Lisko, and Gendaszek found a “desensitization
effect” among jurors. The effect occurs as jurors
become less surprised, over time, about a particular type
of damage. Essentially, the shock value of the incident
declines.
In
the case of Enron, for example, researchers found an initial
reaction of astonishment by jurors at the role played by
Arthur Andersen. Shortly thereafter, however, survey results
showed the accounting profession bouncing back from jurors’
initial disfavor. In fact, mock-trial research suggested
that, after a certain point, jurors were desensitized enough
to hold the plaintiff responsible for not having known better.
Work
quality and outcomes. Research shows that
jurors consider the severity of the consequences associated
with the defendant’s actions. That is, jurors may
disregard the reasons behind the defendant’s action
or the overall quality of the work that was performed if
the outcome was severe.
Consider,
for example, an alleged audit failure where the company
either eventually goes bankrupt or is bought out. The former
is a more severe consequence of the auditor’s alleged
failure to properly report on the financial statements.
In a research study, jurors evaluated such an audit failure
[K. Kadous, “The Effects of Audit Quality and Consequence
Severity on Juror Evaluations of Auditor Responsibility
for Plaintiff Losses,” The Accounting Review,
vol. 75(3), 2000]. Auditors that provided a higher-quality
audit were viewed just as negatively by jurors as those
that provided a lower-quality audit, but only when the consequences
were severe, that is, the client went bankrupt. In the situation
where the client was bought out and continued to operate,
jurors distinguished between high-quality auditors and low-quality
auditors, and evaluated the former much more favorably.
Duane
Brandon, PhD, is an assistant professor,
Jennifer Mueller, PhD, is an assistant professor,
and
Richard Tabor, PhD, is a Torchmark Professor,
all in the school of accountancy, Auburn University, Auburn,
Ala. |