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The
Duty to Correct: The Second Circuit Speaks
By Mark A. Segal
JULY 2008 - In
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (U.S. S.Ct. 1994), the U.S. Supreme Court issued
an opinion that has been construed as a rejection of the notion
of secondary liability based upon “aiding and abetting”
the commission of a primary Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) violation
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The decision in Central
Bank left open the possibility that secondary parties could
be held primarily liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5).
In this regard, the Supreme Court noted:
The absence
of Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free
from liability under the Securities Acts. Any person or entity,
including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which
a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as
a primary violator of Section 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements
for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 have been met.
As a consequence
of Central Bank, securities litigation against accountants
has frequently focused on whether plaintiffs could assert a viable
claim for a primary Section 10(b) and Rule (b)(5) violation. Two
recent decisions by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals—Lattanzio
v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP [476 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2007)]
and Overton v. Todman & Co. [478 F.3d 479 (2d Cir.
2007)]—touch on a specific aspect of recent securities litigation,
namely the extent to which accountants face a “duty to correct.”
Lattanzio
Lattanzio
v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, in its pertinent part, concerned
whether there exists a duty to correct quarterly statements (10-Q)
that had been reviewed but not audited. The case involved the
appeal of a District Court’s dismissal of a securities fraud
action against Deloitte & Touche. The Second Circuit affirmed
the District Court decision. According to the court, a duty to
correct does not equate to remaining silent concerning an actionable
misstatement in a 10-Q. Accountants cannot merely be held “responsible
for the company’s statements ... because the accountant
may know those statements are likely untrue.” Citing
United States v. Natelli [527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1976)], the
Second Circuit noted that an accountant has a “duty to correct”
only where the accountant has audited and issued a certificate
concerning financial statements.
The plaintiffs
had argued that a review should be considered a confirmation of
the company’s financial statements, due to its being mandated
for quarterly statements. The court rejected equating a review
with issuance of a certified opinion on the financial statements.
According
to the court, if Congress had intended to impose duties on a review
similar to those associated with the rendering of an audit opinion,
it would have more clearly established such a rule for review
engagements:
Absent
an audit opinion, the existence of a duty to correct cannot
by itself translate Deloitte’s silence regarding the 10-Qs
into an actionable misstatement. If an accountant does not issue
a public opinion about a company … the accountant cannot
be held responsible for the company’s public statements
... merely because the accountants may know those statements
are untrue ... The accountant’s duty extends only “to
correct those financial statements which the accountant had
audited itself and had issued its certificate.” See in
this regard Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.2d 717 (2d Cir.
1997), In re Cascade International Securities Litigation,
894 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Fl., 1995), and Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (U.S. S.Ct.1980).
The court
also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a review should
be construed as an opinion on the financial statements, due to
the market construing a review as a form of assurance as to their
accuracy. Likewise, the court rejected the assertion that federal
regulations place a duty on accountants to correct “unaudited
statements” if they are false and that a failure to meet
such duty constitutes a breach of Section 10(b).
Pursuant
to the court’s analysis, companies have a choice with respect
to interim financial statements (i.e., a 10-Q) in that they can
either—
- Affirmatively
state that the filing was reviewed by an accountant in conformity
with the regulation, and include the accountant’s report,
or
- Not mention
the mandated review, in which case no accountant report will
be filed.
The court
also rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that failure to
treat a review as giving rise to duties comparable to those of
an audit would make a review a largely meaningless exercise. According
to the court, the fact that a review may be considered optional
does not make it meaningless, as the conduct of a review helps
to increase the likelihood that quarterly statements will be properly
or timely prepared.
Nevertheless,
a review does not constitute a statement attributable to the accountant
for 10(b)(5) purposes. Note that, in Chiarella v. United States,
the Supreme Court found that in order for primary liability to
be found based upon silence, there had to be a duty to speak.
Overton
Overton
v. Todman and Co. concerned the appeal of an order by the
U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ claim of damages due to a primary violation
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10(b)(5) by an accounting firm that had conducted a related audit.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal and
remanded the case to the District Court. The Second Circuit framed
the issue of concern as being:
[W]hether
an auditor may incur primary liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10(b)(5) when the auditor provides a certified opinion
that is false or misleading when issued, subsequently learns
or was reckless in not learning that the earlier opinion was
false or misleading, knows or should know that potential investors
are relying on the opinion, yet fails to take reasonable steps
to correct or withdraw its opinion and/or underlying financial
statements.
Facts.
The auditor, Todman and Co., had issued unqualified opinions for
2002 and earlier years. These opinions had been filed with the
financial statements of the client, Direct Brokerage, Inc. (DBI).
The plaintiffs alleged that the auditor had made significant errors
that led to a failure to report large payroll tax liabilities.
Arguably, these liabilities should have been examined; they went
from being the largest liability of the company in 1998 to zero
in 1999. The plaintiffs asserted that there were various “red
flags” which should have placed the auditor on alert for
such liabilities. Included among the red flags were:
- A large
payroll tax liability in 1998 that the auditor had noted merited
additional investigation.
- No post-1998
payroll tax liabilities, despite the fact that individuals were
working for the company.
- The auditor
knew that the client had individuals working for it, and that
the client had payroll taxes that were due.
- The company’s
payroll tax obligations dropped to zero in 1999, despite there
being a substantial increase in the compensation paid.
- The auditor
did not investigate why these developments occurred.
DBI encountered
difficulty with the New York State Division of Taxation, resulting
in the company conducting its own internal investigation. The
internal investigation found that the ex-CFO had not recorded
payroll tax liabilities on the company’s books. In addition,
the company hired a forensic accounting firm which determined
that the outside audit was “deficient in certain respects.”
According
to the court, accountants have a duty to correct misstatements
that are discovered in financial statements the accountant has
prepared and certified, and upon which they know the public is
relying. The Second Circuit had previously addressed a case in
which the issue of a duty to correct arose with respect to a situation
wherein investors brought an action alleging primary liability
by an accountant with regard to financial projections which had
appeared in a partnership-offering memoranda but did not indicate
that one of the principals had been convicted of a felony or that
the principal’s 12-year-old son was the sole officer, director,
and shareholder of the managing entity. The court found that the
accountant could not be held liable, as there was no duty to disclose
for merely making projections. To quote Shapiro [123
F.3d 717 (2d. Cir. 1997)], amenability to primary liability in
the case required that there had been a certified opinion:
The concept
of a duty to disclose appears to stem from the extent of reliance
on the accountant’s work made by the public and the expectations
of the public. Clearly, in a situation in which the accountant
“gives an opinion or certifies statements” about
a company—statements which the accountant later discovers
may not have been accurate ... then the accountant has a duty
to disclose the fraud to the public. ...
Conversely,
if an accountant does not issue a public opinion about a company,
although it may have conducted internal audits or reviews for
portions of the company, the accountant cannot subsequently be
held responsible for the company’s public statements issued
later merely because the accountant may know those statements
are likely true. [See also In re Cascade International Securities
Litigation, 894 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Fla., 1995).]
Overton
and the Certified Opinion: An Overview
In Overton,
a certified opinion had been issued by the auditor. Thus, the
duty to disclose was conceivable. Issuance of a certified opinion
provides a measure of assurance as to the credibility of the financial
statements, so that others may rely on such financial statements
as having been audited by a certified professional (i.e., a special
relationship with the public or trust). In this regard, a certified
opinion is distinct from other types of work issued by an accountant.
Issuance of such opinion establishes a special relationship between
the accountant and other parties, that is, the investing public
and outside creditors. The certified opinion indicates that the
accountant is acting “independently to provide assurance
as to whether the company statements have been audited and that
such work, procedures, and analysis and the consequent representations
and opinion are accurate and reliable.” Furthermore, the
court noted that a duty to disclose facts may also arise where
the accountant acts as an insider, rather than as an independent
party.
Thus, according
to the Second Circuit, an accountant could be found primarily
liable under Section 10(b) or Rule 10(b)(5), due to the violation
of a duty to correct where the accountant:
1) makes
a statement in its certified opinion that is false or misleading
when made; 2) subsequently learns or was reckless in not learning
that the earlier statement was false or misleading; 3) know[s]
or should know that potential investors are relying on the opinion
and financial statements; 4) fails to take reasonable steps
to correct or withdraw its opinion and/or the financial statements;
and 5) all other requirements for liability are satisfied.
The court’s
decision in Overton appears to be consistent with Central
Bank of Denver in that, for liability, the accountant must
make a misleading omission by failing to correct its certified
opinion, and the reliance by investors on the accountant’s
omission constitutes a component of the duty to correct.
Implications
It should
be kept in mind that in Overton, it is the duty to correct
a certified opinion that was at issue, and not a purported duty
to update the financial statements themselves. The issue of whether
there is a duty to update the opinion generally relates to situations
where the accountant has made a statement which later proves to
be inaccurate due to intervening events.
Section 10(b)
and Rule 10(b)(5) continue to be raised by plaintiffs as grounds
for accountant liability. The Lattanzio and Overton
decisions provide insight into the analysis used in such cases.
In evaluating these cases, it is important to note that these
were decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and other
circuits might not follow the same reasoning. Likewise, other
grounds and arguments continue to be potential sources of accountant
liability, such as common law or other securities law provisions.
A balance
must be struck that includes reasonable protection of third parties,
while not subjecting secondary actors to unreasonable risk. The
integrity of the capital markets remains dependent upon the availability
and effective provision of audit services. As the determination
of appropriate standards of care continues to evolve, it should
be noted that the fortunes of audit services and the capital markets
are intertwined. At present, the Big Four dominate the audit of
publicly held companies. While these firms should be held to reasonable
and consistent standards with regard to such services, an allowance
of too ambiguous or inconsistent grounds for liability risks defeats
the exact purpose that the audit was intended to serve. The potential
consequences of ambiguous or inconsistent grounds for liability
include the following:
- The lack
of available or affordable insurance for auditors;
- Increased
tension between the auditor and the corporation to be audited;
- Increased
allotment of time for engagements and procedures, with an attendant
increase in cost; and
- Increased
likelihood of further concentration of, if not the eventual
absence of, competition between providers of audit services.
As noted
in 2006 by the United States Chamber of Commerce, the potential
risk of being held liable for civil fraud with regard to audit
engagements is so severe that, one day, the audit profession may
be deemed uninsurable.
Mark
A. Segal, LLM, CPA, is a professor of accounting at the
Mitchell College of Business, University of South Alabama, Mobile,
Ala.
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