Reducing
Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Costs
Is the Top-Down, Risk-Based Audit Approach
a Solution, or a Mistake?
By
Thomas A. Basilo
JANUARY
2007 - I think everyone would agree that the costs of complying
with section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) have
been excessive. I also think that something needs to be done
to reduce the costs for nonaccelerated filers, because they
are expected to be relatively more significant than those
for most accelerated filers. The Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) is currently drafting new guidance
utilizing the “top-down, risk-based approach”
(specified in the PCAOB’s May 2005 guidance to audit
firms) as part of a solution for reducing the cost of SOX.
I am not convinced that this approach is the answer.
Historical
Background and the Big Picture
In
a top-down, risk-based approach, the auditor identifies
the controls to test by starting with entity-level controls
and then moving on to controls for significant financial
statement accounts. Finally, the auditor examines individual
controls at the transaction level, as well as disclosure
controls.
This
approach is the exact same starting point that most SOX
consulting firms advised for the first wave of accelerated
filers. There seems to be a misconception that this approach
was not considered for accelerated filers. It was, in fact,
strongly recommended by the PCAOB in its Auditing Standard
(AS) 2. Certainly, the tone at the top is extremely important
in assessing the nature, timing, and extent of testing the
process, transaction, and application-level controls. What,
then, is so different from the PCAOB’s May 2005 guidance
that will lead to drastically reduced SOX compliance costs?
A few
years ago, the use of risk-based auditing by the Big Four
was deemed to be a major contributor to the frauds at HealthSouth,
Tyco, Parmalat, and WorldCom. In 2004, Jonathan Weil, then
a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, was extremely
harsh on auditors and stated that a risk-based audit can
miss problems. In 2003, PCAOB board member Daniel Goelzer
called the risk-based approach a major contributor to the
erosion of public trust in auditing.
I firmly
believe that risk-based auditing is one of the main reasons
for the high cost of SOX compliance. The risk-based audit
approach usually minimizes the testing of controls and focuses
the audit on a test of significant or high-risk balance
sheet accounts. By concentrating on accounts identified
as high risk, other areas that may pose risks but have not
been labeled as such are often overlooked. Because many
auditors have been using a risk-based audit approach in
their financial statement audits, many companies, in an
effort to satisfy their auditors’ needs, have failed
to keep their internal control systems documentation current
for less-relevant accounts, and therefore need considerable
time to update the documentation for SOX compliance.
When
I began my auditing career 35 years ago, all of the then–Big
Eight were using an integrated audit approach (defined as
a process that combined detailed testing of internal controls
with testing of the year-end balance sheet). The years passed,
and competition for clients became intense as rules restricting
advertising and the unwritten agreement to “not covet
thy competitor’s client” went by the wayside.
Pressures
on cost containment became paramount, and bidding wars ensued
as the audit became more of a commodity. The integrated
audit approach was deemed inefficient, and auditors began
to develop new approaches to reduce costs. KPMG is widely
believed to have been the first firm to advocate risk-based
auditing, in the early 1990s. Because the “new”
audit approach helped reduce audit hours by greatly reducing
the time required to assess internal controls, all of the
other large firms quickly embraced it, thereby leading to
the reduction of both internal control system documentation
and detailed internal control testing.
The
bigger picture indicates that the integrated audit approach
was shelved in favor of the risk-based audit approach because
of the difficulty auditors had in making the correlation
between the internal control testing and the reduction of
year-end tests of balance sheet items. Even if no exceptions
were found in any of the internal control tests, auditors
were hard-pressed to find which substantive tests of account
balances could be reduced or eliminated at year-end. For
example, maybe the number of accounts receivable confirmations
could be reduced, or the number of bank reconciliations
could be cut back, but because both areas were always considered
high-risk the audit partner was often reluctant to go that
route.
As
the audit became a commodity, many accounting firms started
to more aggressively pursue new areas for revenue enhancement,
such as consulting and tax shelters. Ultimately, this laid
the foundation for the unfortunate incidents that placed
a dark cloud over the profession.
Identifying
high-risk areas is a matter of judgment, and these judgments
are not always easy to make. Some risk areas are somewhat
obvious. For example, the application of new accounting
rules is high-risk, and auditors pay significant attention
when a new rule needs to be adopted. Similarly, complex
accounting rules, such as hedging and derivative accounting,
business combinations, and revenue recognition, are also
audited closely. Determining other areas of risk is not
so easy, and inconsistencies can be made on the assessments
of those risks. Monographs
issued by the Big Eight started to talk about the use of
analytical techniques, industry data, and more involvement
in the planning process by the partners as supplements to
the risk-based audit to compensate for the lack of detailed
internal control testing. Back in the 1980s, however, attitudes
were different and the investment community generally understood
that the auditing standards emphasized the limitations on
the auditors’ ability to detect fraud, especially
if there was collusion.
It
seems to me that a major cause of corporate fraud that led
to SOX can be traced back to the institution of risk-based
auditing, because audits became predictable. Merely asking
questions of top executives regarding risks, and documenting
their responses—which drove the selection of the nature,
timing, and extent of audit procedures—often did not
work, because the executives being asked the questions were
also the ones involved in the fraud. I wonder whether the
corporate fraud issues would be as prevalent if the integrated
audit of 30 years ago had been in place during the past
decade. I doubt it would have prevented Enron, but it might
have deterred the situations at WorldCom and HealthSouth.
Although
I do not believe that instituting a top-down, risk-based
approach will be the complete answer to reducing SOX compliance
costs, I think the initial costs of SOX compliance were
out of line and that implementing a modified risk-based
approach is in order. I believe that the high initial-year
costs for accelerated filers were due to three critical,
but solvable, problems:
-
The learning curve associated with implementing a new
standard such as SOX always takes longer the first time
around. The increased experience of SOX consulting firms,
coupled with improved software to manage SOX compliance,
will reduce costs going forward.
-
Companies neglected their internal control documentation
because of risk-based auditing. Now that companies have
gone through the painful initial process of updating their
documentation, the SOX compliance process will go smoother.
-
Companies that waited until the last minute to start their
SOX compliance process caused an increased demand for
qualified SOX consulting firms, which could not be met
in time for many companies to complete their documentation
and testing requirements. Today, more companies are qualified
to do SOX compliance consulting work, and the nonaccelerated
filers have been granted extensions through December 31,
2007. If nonaccelerated filers act soon, deadline pressure
will not affect them and their costs will be reduced.
No
Simple Answers
During
this era of SOX compliance, there are far too many instances
where simplistic answers are offered for complex questions.
Companies and regulators need to use caution in thinking
that any one approach will solve all of the issues. Regulators
should also understand the inherent limitations of a risk-based
approach and weigh the consequences of missing potential
internal control weaknesses and making the compliance assessment
process predictable.
AS
2 already provides for auditor reliance on the work of independent
and competent internal auditors and SOX consulting firms.
Many independent auditors, however, failed to use this provision
in the first round of testing and chose to retest all of
the accounts. The most effective way to accomplish the goal
of SOX compliance is to create a well-thought-out plan with
open and frequent communication among the company, its SOX
consultant, and its independent auditor. This should be
coupled with an independent auditor that places more reliance
on internal audit work wherever permitted, but not tied
solely to low-risk accounts, especially when the definition
of low-risk is so subjective. We cannot afford another era
of scandal and a weakened investor market caused by applying
techniques that have failed in the past. As the saying goes,
“Those who do not learn from history are bound to
repeat it.” We are at a crossroad where this is as
relevant as ever.
Thomas
A. Basilo is chairman and CEO of WithumSmith+Brown
Global Assurance, LLC (www.wsbga.com),
Princeton, N.J.
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