September
What Controversy?
I have several comments and concerns
about the May article, “Accounting for Stock Options: The Controversy Continues”
(Nicholas G. Apostolou and D. Larry Crumbley):
- The “In Brief” says
“[t]he intrinsic value method, however, triggers footnote disclosure of the effect
on earnings, whereas the fair value method does not.” I think this is backwards:
The FASB 123 fair value method “triggers” the extensive footnote disclosures,
whereas the APB 25 intrinsic value method did not require any new disclosures
when it was originally issued.
- The “In Brief” goes on to say “stock options
continue to be ‘stealth compensation,’ deductible for tax purposes without diluting
financial earnings.” However, not all stock options are deductible for tax purposes.
As opposed to nonqualified stock options, incentive stock options are not deductible
for tax purposes either when granted or when exercised. Then it says “[t]he authors
surveyed the 1998 annual reports of 30 companies that used the fair value method
rather than the intrinsic value method.” Again, this is backwards; in fact all
of these companies used the intrinsic value method for financial reporting purposes
and the pro forma impact of fair value method was reported in their footnotes.
- The article itself states, “[f]or years, stock options have been ‘stealth
compensation’: expenses that are not charged against financial statement income
but are deductible for tax purposes.” Again, incentive stock options are not deductible
for tax purposes either when granted or when exercised.
- The reason for a
parenthetical reference to SFAS 123 at the end of the first paragraph is unclear
because FIN 44 interprets only APB 25, not SFAS 123.
- The authors should have
updated the article instead of relying on and quoting from the exposure draft
issued in March 1999. The two quotes in the second paragraph were not carried
forward to the final document. More important, the article says “grants to independent
directors, contractors, and other service providers that are not employees for
payroll tax purposes should be accounted for at fair value in accordance with
SFAS 123.” This is inaccurate. Question 2 of Interpretation 44 says (in part)
that “[a] nonemployee member of an entity’s board of directors does not meet the
definition of an employee.... However, an exception is made to require the application
of Opinion 25 to stock compensation granted to a nonemployee member of the grantor’s
board of directors for services provided as a director if the nonemployee director
(a) was elected by the grantor’s shareholders or (b) was appointed to a board
position that will be filled by shareholder election when the existing term expires.”
- The discussion of repricings is interesting, but the examples are three years
old and should have been more recent (e.g., 2000 repricings). Of current interest
is the SEC staff’s view on the accounting for the rescission of the exercise of
employee stock options, which was a prevalent and recent option transaction (see
EITF Topic D-93).
- Under “Background” the authors say “SFAS 123 allows—but
does not require—that compensation cost resulting from the granting of stock options
be measured and reported currently in the income statement and allocated over
the remaining life of the option.” This cost “allocated over the remaining life
of the option” is contradicted in the next paragraph, which makes the point that
“compensation expense [is recognized] in the income statement over the vesting
period” and again later where the authors repeat this: “Compensation cost should
be accrued in the period from grant date to vesting date, based the estimated
number of options expected to vest or be exercised.”
- Under “Black-Scholes
Option Pricing Model,” the article says that the model “calculates the present
value of a stock option as of its grant date.” Because this model is not a present
value calculation, it would be better to say “calculates the fair value of a stock
option.”
- The authors rightfully point out that, of the six Black-Scholes
factors, volatility has the most impact on the fair value of the option (i.e.,
the higher the volatility factor, the higher the compensation cost). However,
the next most material input is the expected life of the option. The authors point
out the range of lives in the Exhibit (from less than a year to seven years) but
omit how important a factor the life is. The authors do discuss the risk-free
rate, which has a very minor influence on the fair value (i.e., the higher the
risk-free rate, the greater the compensation cost).
- The idea behind the subtitle
of the article—“The Controversy Continues”—is never fulfilled. FASB 123 has been
in effect for many years, so what is the controversy in 2001? Who are the parties
to this controversy?
Robert N. Waxman, CPA
Corporate Finance Advisory
New York, N.Y.
Editor’s Note: The writer is immediate past chair of the NYSSCPA SEC Practice
Committee.
The
Authors Respond:
We certainly appreciate Robert Waxman’s detailed response to our article. However,
we did not write the “In Brief”: the errors in that section of the article are
editorial in nature.
In terms of the article itself, Waxman is only partially correct about the deductibility
of stock options (e.g., stealth compensation). A company may claim a deduction
for incentive stock options (ISO) if they become “messed-up ISOs.” Stock options
may start out as ISOs, but one of the conditions may not be satisfied (i.e., holding
periods). For a messed-up ISO, a company should be able to take a deduction in
the same year that the employee recognizes ordinary income on the spread at the
sale date.
Although we do not have the data, we suspect that nonqualified stock options (NQSO)
are more common than ISOs because NQSOs provide more tax advantages for companies
than ISOs. For example, according to the New York Times (June 20, 2001,
p. C1, 8), stock option tax benefits made up 67% of operating cash flow at Sun
Microsystems, 41% at Cisco Systems, 34% at Yahoo, and 30% at Juniper Networks.
Waxman
is correct in pointing out the slip under “Background” as to the allocation of
stock option expense. As the article mentions, compensation expense is recognized
over the vesting period—the time between the grant date and the vesting date.
Mr.
Waxman’s doubt about the continuing nature of the controversy over not expensing
stock options is easily refuted. A Fortune cover story titled “The amazing
stock option sleight of hand” (June 25, 2001) discusses the very same issue. The
article concludes that “No amount of accounting magic can change this fact: Options
aren’t free”. The article includes two tables that illustrate the effect of expensing
stock options on earnings per share: one for “old economy” stocks and another
for “new economy” stocks. As the table in our article also indicates, the potential
dilution from expensing stock options is much more pronounced for new economy
stocks than for old economy stocks. In addition, extensive coverage of stock options
was presented on June 4, 2001, in the Wall Street Journal (p. C1, C17),
and the New York Times on June 20, 2001 (p. C1, C8). The New York Times
article makes the same point we make and bears repeating: “because the cost of
stock option grants are not considered a wage expense, the earnings at companies
giving out large option grants looked better than the results at companies that
paid cash to workers.”
Finally, readers should judge the continuing importance of the controversy by
the performance of the stocks in our table. The stocks of companies whose earnings
would have been most affected by expensing stock options plunged far more in the
recent stock market debacle than stocks of companies that relied less on options
as a form of compensation.
Nicholas G. Apostolou, PhD, CPA
D. Larry Crumbley, PhD, CPA
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge
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