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By Lawrence Palaszynski, CPA Buy/sell agreements are an overlooked or downplayed factor when valuing
a closely held business. The primary purposes of these agreements are to
1) provide liquidity and create a market to sell shares, 2) set a price
for the shares, and 3) provide for a continuity protecting against unwanted
new partners. A legally enforceable buy/sell agreement may set a price that may not
approximate the fair market value of the business. For example common methods
and problems include-- * Net Book Value--No relevance to current value of assets and does not
consider earnings, * Adjusted Net Book Value--Adjusts the balance sheet to fair market
value however still does not consider earnings, * Adjusted Net Book Value plus an earnings multiple--Adjusts the balance
sheet to fair market value and then adds a multiple of average of earnings
or cash flow. This last formula is the most commonly used method due to
ease of understanding and apparent concreteness of the factors to be employed.
Everyone agrees that every business is unique yet most use the same
basic formulas. But these formulas bring problems with them. First, they do not allow for earnings trends. For example, a company
with annual earnings of $100,000, $50,000, and $0 in consecutive years
would be valued the same as a company with the total opposite earnings
trend of $0, $50,000, and $100,000. Obviously, the company that has the
increasing earnings trend has more value. Other common problems using formulas include the following: 1. Not taking into account changes in-- * regulation * the product's market * technology * local economic conditions * covenants and restrictions posed by new bank financing * changes in tax statutes (sub S to C or LLP) * the company's ability to borrow 2. Definition of earnings may be disputable--for example when the valuation
formula calls for adjusted book value plus five times earnings, does earnings
mean-- * before tax or after tax * tax or book * cash or accrual * income before extraordinary items or adjusted for accounting changes
(LIFO vs. FIFO, changes in reserves for bad debts) * earnings before any normalization adjustment? If not, what adjustments
should be made for the owners' salaries, rents, interest, and other perks
* using the last ending accounting period before or after the triggering
event. It is sometimes assumed the buy/sell agreement will automatically set
value in the estate and gift tax arena. While the agreement may set a legally
enforceable price that must be paid by the parties, the tax court may set
it aside as a tax avoidance device. For example, a company's buy/sell formula
sets an exchange value of $1 million. The tax court deems the buy/sell
agreement a tax avoidance device, sets the formula aside and values the
interest at $3 million. Two problems then arise; first, the estate does
not receive full value for the stock; second, the higher-than-anticipated
estate tax paid by the estate on $3 million may cause the beneficiaries
to receive much less than planned and possibly not have enough cash to
pay the estate tax. A buy/sell agreement can establish the estate tax value of closely held
stock only if it satisfies specific conditions prescribed by Reg. section
20.2031-2(h) and IRC section 2703. The regulation provides that agreements
entered into before October 9, 1990, and not substantially modified thereafter
will be considered in valuing the decedent's stock for estate tax purposes
if both of the following conditions are met: 1. The agreement is a bona fide business arrangement. 2. The agreement is not a device to pass the decedent's shares to the
natural heirs for less than adequate consideration. Modifications that are not substantial include-- 1. those required by the agreement. 2. discretionary (does not change rights or ownership) changes such
as a change in the company's name. 3. modification of capitalization rates due to specified market interest
rate changes. 4. modification to produce a closer approximation to fair market value.
Section 2703 added to the IRC in 1990 as part of the anti-estate freeze
provisions of Chapter 14, added a third requirement for certain related
parties. It states that the terms must be comparable to similar arrangements
reached by persons in an arm's length transaction, a tough thing to prove.
This rule seems very open to speculation; however setting a fair market
price is obviously the intent. It may be wise to avoid modifications to an agreement that is grandfathered
or was made before October 9, 1990. The old rules without the comparability
test are easier to satisfy. However, the Estate of Lauder case suggests
that all agreements may fall under the 1990 change. There are several ways to add support to the position that the buy/sell
agreement is a bona fide business arrangement and not a tax avoidance device:
1. Show the parties' intentions in the document itself. For example,
courts have found that restrictions on ownership or transfers of stock
to maintain a particular ownership or continuity of management are legitimate
reasons for entering into a buy/sell agreement. In Rudolph, DC Ind.,
2/5/93 the court found where a valid business purpose had been established;
the IRS bore the burden of proof that it was testamentary intent. 2. The stock price as well as restrictions must bind both shareholder
and the shareholder's estate. Two separate calculations will show the wrong
intentions. 3. The agreement may be set aside if it was ignored in the past by the
owners. For example, if the stock was sold not at formula prices or was
not first offered to the corporation as required by the agreement, the
courts may set the agreement aside. 4. Release clauses that release the estate from its obligation to sell
if the IRS rejects the agreement's valuation for estate tax purposes may
prove fatal. 5. If the agreement was reasonable when it was reached, subsequent events
may not invalidate the agreement. However if the original formula, due
to changes in economic or operating conditions, is no longer an appropriate
means of determining FMV, courts have set the agreement aside citing the
parties' failure to provide for a reassessment of the formula. 6. An agreement's intent is highly suspect when it is entered into when
one of the parties is in poor health. 7. Another way to rebut the tax avoidance device issue is to show that
the decedent's heirs did not benefit from the buy/sell agreement. 8. Factors suggesting arm's length transaction include use of independent
counsel, outside appraisers, and evidence of a negotiation process. Nearly all buy/sell agreements allow for death or retirement as a trigger.
But important events to be also considered are disability, divorce, firing
of a minority owner, or the personal bankruptcy of an owner; these will
affect the buy/sell agreement and related value computations. It must be noted that not all shareholder agreements that discuss a
transaction price are bona fide buy/sell agreements. If the document contains
no triggering event such as death, it would not be construed as an enforceable
buy/sell agreement in the event of death of the shareholder. Recently the issue of a contingent liability that triggers a buy/sell
agreement has arisen. Two problems can arise. First, as shown previously,
the formulas used can provide many buy back prices, thus creating room
for argument. Second, does a mandatory company stock buy back have a significant
impact on the company's operating cash flow thereby increasing risk to
an investor and thus impairing the firm's value? Buy/sell agreements should be part of every company's initial setup
and planning. It is surprising how many companies do not have one. What
is even more surprising is the relatively little weight given in planning
and monitoring a document that may dictate the company's future. * By Susan R. Schoenfeld, Esq., CPA How does a testator make provision for a surviving pet after the decedent's
death? This situation can arise in a number of circumstances, although
typically, it involves a single person living alone, or a married couple
with no children, for whom the animals are the family. Until recently, New York clients with beloved animals had no legally
effective way to make sure their pets would continue to be properly cared
for. Usually, the Will would be drafted to provide that the pet would be
left to a certain person, together with a sum of money, with a precatory
request that the pet be cared for. Or alternatively, a sum of money would
be left to a certain person contingent on their agreement to care for the
pet. Neither of these provisions was legally enforceable. New EPTL section 7-6.1 (effective June 1996) permits honorary trusts
in New York for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal, enforceable
at law. The practice commentary to the statute notes that prior to this
new rule, trusts for the benefit of animals were not legally enforceable
because a trust must have a beneficiary able to compel enforcement of the
trust, and also because the perpetuities period is measured by only human
lives. Under the new law, a person is designated to enforce the trust terms.
Further, the trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust,
or after 21 years, whichever comes first, thereby solving the perpetuities
objection. The trust may be set up as an inter-vivos instrument, although typically
it would appear in the pet owner's Will. The trust should name and describe
the animal to be benefited by the trust and describe the intended use of
the income and principal for the pet's benefit. Unless expressly permitted
in the trust document, the trustee may not use trust funds for any purpose
other than the benefit of the covered animal. Upon termination of the trust, whether upon death of the covered animal
or the passage of 21 years, any unexpended trust property would pass as
directed in the trust instrument or, in the absence of direction, to the
estate of the grantor. A testator should not use this new provision as an opportunity to grossly
overfund a pet trust. If a court determines that the amount of property
in the trust substantially exceeds the amount necessary for the stated
purpose of caring for the animal, it may reduce the principal of the trust.
The excess would pass as unexpended trust property as directed in the trust
instrument, otherwise, to the grantor's estate. The testator should name a trustee to carry out his or her wishes on
behalf of the pet. Ideally, the testator should discuss his or her plans
for the pet trust with the named trustee, to make sure the intended trustee
is willing and able to act in that capacity. The court may appoint a trustee
on behalf of the animal if there is no designated trustee willing to act
as such. The court is also given discretion to make any other determinations
it sees fit to carry out the transferor's intent in providing for the animal.
All seriousness aside, this provision lends itself to some fun questions.
Does the trust get an income distribution deduction, and if so, should
Fido (or Socks) now file an income tax return to pay tax on the income?
Is this trust property referred to as a Qualified "Domestic"
Trust? And, would a notarized pawprint be sufficient for the pet to disclaim
its interest in the trust? * Editors: Lawrence Foster, CPA Contributing Editors: Frank G. Colella, LLM, CPA Jerome Landau, JD, CPA Eric Kramer,JD, CPA James McEvoy, CPA
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